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Thanks to Professor Louise Ellen Teitz, and to the ILA and ASIL for
initiating this joint study panel.
Our topic brings to mind the tale of the blind men and the elephant. The
most reliable of all sources, Wikipedia, attributes the tale variously to Sufis,
Jainists, Buddhists, or Hindus. Whoever created the tale, we all know it. A
group of blind men, or men in the dark, encounter an elephant. It is not a
presidential election year, so the elephant is in a mellow mood. It stands by
while the blind men examine it to ascertain its true character. Each man
examines one different part-the leg, the tail, the trunk, the ear, and so on.
They then compare notes. Each insists on a different vision of the elephant-as
a tree, a rope, a hose, and so on.
My task today is to try to describe the parts of the elephant. What are the
elements involved in thinking clearly about transparency in international
commercial arbitration?
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I. ARBITRATION
Let's begin with "arbitration." As you know, the essential concept is that
parties agree to authorize an independent, impartial third party to render a
legally binding decision in a dispute. The legal systems of many countries
sanction, indeed encourage this, and they have adopted supportive laws and
policies. They do this in various ways, both positive and negative. In a positive
way, their courts will enforce agreements to arbitrate and the awards resulting
from a properly conducted arbitration, following some limited review aimed at
maintaining the integrity of the process. In a negative way, courts will not
otherwise intrude deeply into the process or review the merits of arbitrators'
decisions.
There is great controversy in this country about the widespread use of
boilerplate arbitration clauses in some types of domestic relationships, such as
employment contracts, consumer credit, nursing homes, and securities
transactions. The controversy reflects concerns that these clauses do not reflect
informed agreement, involve parties of unequal bargaining power and that the
mechanisms for arbitrating such claims are defective. These domestic
transactions are not what we are discussing here. We are concerned with
agreements to arbitrate growing out of international transactions, typically
involving sophisticated businesses, investors and governments.
II. INTERNATIONAL
We are also concerned only with arbitration involving international
transactions. Given this audience, I think I can safely assume that everyone has
a general idea of what "international" means, although you should be warned
that the concept sometimes causes difficulties.
m. COMMERCIAL
Next, what do we mean by "commercial?" Here things begin to get
complicated. We risk serious muddle if we don't keep some distinctions in
mind.
A few decades ago, international arbitration mostly involved disputes
between private parties growing out of commercial relationships. It involved
disputes concerning the sale of goods, construction projects, ship charters,
franchises and the like. The rules applied were drawn from national law or the
laws and customs of merchants engaged in a particular line of commerce. Most
international commercial arbitration is still between private parties and grows
out of these sorts of transactions.
But now, a new type of arbitration has developed in parallel with older
forms of commercial arbitration. Over the last two or three decades, there has
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been dramatic growth in international arbitrations involving disputes between
investors and foreign governments, where claimants assert rights based upon
public international law-often a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) or other
similar public law instrument.
These investment arbitrations clash with the notion of arbitration as the
fruit of agreements between private actors. One of the parties is a State. It has
important responsibilities and legal obligations to its citizens. These cases
often involve attacks on important policies and practices of the host
governments and claims for a great deal of money. This has led some arbitral
tribunals to call for much greater transparency in these proceedings, to much
critical discussion, and to significant changes in some settings, notably North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), aimed at encouraging transparency
in investment cases.
IV. TRANSPARENCY
Now comes the biggest piece of the elephant. What do we mean by
transparency? There is no single definition for these purposes, and people often
mean very different things when they talk about transparency. You need to
listen carefully, to be sure what is being talked about. There are many relevant
questions.
1) Who should be able to know whether there is even a dispute
being arbitrated?
2) Should parties be able to provide information about cases under
arbitration to their stockholders? Should they discuss them in
the press or before governmental bodies?
3) Should outside persons be able to see the pleadings, the
evidence and the arguments? If so, which outside persons?
4) Should outside persons be able to attend or view the hearings?
What about presenting arguments in them? In this regard, some
writers see an important distinction between "privacy" of
arbitral proceedings, and "confidentiality." Is this a clear
distinction? Is it useful?
5) Should outside persons be able to file materials to be considered
by the arbitrators? Which outside persons? Who decides?
What standards should guide the decision?
6) And, if outside persons are allowed to make filings, what can
they file? Who should bear the parties' additional costs of
responding? An extra round of briefing in a big investment case
can be very expensive.
7) Who should be able to see the eventual award? All of it? Or
just some? If only part, how much? Just the result? The rea-
soning? What about the identities of the parties and arbitrators?
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8) Are things different if the parties have included provisions
explicitly regulating any of these matters?
For a long time, many people thinking about these sorts of issues tended
to do so in light of the fundamental character of international commercial
arbitration as a private system for settling disputes. States allowed private
parties to settle their disputes through mechanisms they selected or created.
They did not regulate parties' choices regarding matters like confidentiality.
Indeed, for a long time, it was widely assumed that confidentiality was an
inherent aspect of arbitration-that every agreement to arbitrate included an
implicit confidentiality provision. The rules of international arbitral institutions
tended to assume that proceedings were private, although the eventual award
might become public in enforcement proceedings under the New York
Convention or otherwise.'
In recent years, courts in some important countries have rejected the notion
that confidentiality is an implicit element of agreements to arbitrate. The
highest courts in Australia and Sweden have said that it is not, as have some
U.S. courts.2  Other courts-in the United Kingdom, France and other
jurisdictions-continue to see confidentiality as inherent.3 And, as I noted a
minute ago, there have been significant developments aimed at increasing
transparency in investment arbitration.
In considering these questions today, we should ask, "Who are the relevant
stakeholders?"
The parties to the arbitration have a stake. Parties may have very sound
reasons for desiring confidentiality. Confidentiality is not necessarily a dirty
word. Parties may want to protect business practices, industrial processes, trade
secrets, to shield a valued ongoing relationship, or to prevent public posturing
that may worsen matters. Particularly in arbitrations involving states,
confidentiality may relieve pressures for States to take and maintain extreme
positions. Writers sometimes imply that parties seek confidentiality primarily
because someone has fouled up and wants to avoid embarrassment. That
sometimes may occur, but it is not a fair or sufficient description.
How important is confidentiality to arbitrating parties? The few studies
that have sought to collect hard data give inconsistent answers. A 2006 survey
of numerous arbitration practitioners by PricewaterhouseCoopers and the
School of International Arbitration at Queen Mary College of London found
that privacy was quite important to those surveyed, ranking a close second
1. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 330 U.N.T.S 38.
2. Cindy G. Buys, The Tensions Between Confidentiality and Transparency in International
Arbitration, 14 Am. REV. INT'L ARB. 121, 129-30 (2003).
3. Id. at 130.
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(surpassed only the by the enforceability of arbitral awards) as a key value.'
However, in another study of international cases administered by the American
Arbitration Association (AAA), fewer than ten percent of participants identified
privacy as one of the most important attributes of arbitration.' Other studies
reflect similarly varying perspectives.
The public at large? Or "civil society," to use the more politically current
term? Here, I expect Dan Magraw will have some views, particularly with
reference to investment arbitrations or other cases involving issues of
potentially large public significance.
The College of International Lawyers? Many of you know of Oscar
Schacter's wonderful notion of "the Invisible College of International
Lawyers."6 There's a good case that the "Invisible College" is also a stake-
holder. Important commentators remind us that international arbitration has
become an important generator of public and private international law. Given
this, they argue, there is a broad community interest in open access to arbitral
awards, to permit analysis, criticism, and growth of the law. Commentators
also have noted that publication will enhance predictability and reduce erratic
or unpredictable outcomes. They also suggest that greater visibility will contri-
bute to the continued acceptance, credibility, and legitimacy of arbitration.
As we proceed with our inquiry, I suspect that we will find that there is no
one-size-fits-all answer to any of these questions. Answers may be shaped by
variables such as the subject matter, the characteristics of the parties, the types
of information involved, and the legal basis of the claims.
And so, we return to the blind men and the elephant.
Like the elephant, our subject has many related parts, all playing an
important and legitimate role. It will be our challenge to try to assemble them
into a coherent whole.
4. PricewaterhouseCoopers & Queen Mary College of London, International Arbitration:
Corporate Attitudes and Practices 2006 2 (2006), available at http://www.pwcadvisory.co.jp/common/media/
InternationalArbitration.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2009).
5. Richard W. Nainark & Stephanie E. Keer, What Do Parties Really Want From International
CommercialArbitration, AAA DisP. RESOL. J. 78,80 (Nov. 2002/Jan. 2003). See also Richard W. Naimark
& Stephanie E. Keer, Expectations and Perceptions of Attorneys and Business People: A Forced-Rank
Analysis, 30 INT'L BUS. L. 203, 204 (2002).
6. See Oscar Schachter, The Invisible College oflInternational Lawyers, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 217
(1977).
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